.pdf.webp?ssl=1)
Cybersecurity firms Dragos and Gambit Security uncovered that the attackers heavily relied on Anthropic’s Claude and OpenAI’s GPT models to accelerate their intrusion between December 2025 and February 2026.
By framing malicious prompts as authorized penetration testing, the hackers bypassed AI safety guardrails to map enterprise networks and directly target operational technology (OT) infrastructure.
While the attackers ultimately failed to breach the core industrial control systems, their operation marks a critical shift.
AI did not independently execute the breach or invent novel zero-day exploits. Instead, it drastically reduced the time, technical effort, and expertise required to identify highly sensitive OT assets within a traditional IT network.
Claude AI Targets Utilities
The attackers established their initial foothold within the utility’s IT environment, likely through vulnerable web servers or stolen credentials.
Once inside, they used Claude as their primary operational engine. The AI processed environmental data and generated tailored, malicious code in near real-time.
The most alarming artifact recovered was a 17,000-line Python script named “BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR.” Written entirely by Claude, this custom framework consolidated 49 different hacking modules based on publicly available open-source techniques.
It handled network enumeration, credential harvesting, Active Directory interrogation, privilege escalation, and lateral movement.
By continuously feeding operational results back into the AI, the adversary refined their command-and-control framework from a basic script to a production-grade tool in just two days.
What traditionally takes advanced persistent threats weeks of custom malware development was compressed into mere hours.
After mapping the internal network, Claude identified a server hosting a vNode industrial gateway.
Even without prior specific context about the utility’s industrial setup, the AI correctly flagged this Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) interface as a critical national infrastructure asset.
It recognized the gateway as the primary access path bridging the IT network and the operational systems that control the municipal water supply.
According to Dragos research, Claude advised the hackers to launch a targeted password-spraying attack against the vNode web interface.
The AI rapidly generated custom credential lists by combining default vendor passwords, environment-specific naming conventions, and credentials harvested from other compromised government networks.
Fortunately, the automated password spray failed, and the attackers did not gain access to the underlying control systems.
Follow us on Google News , LinkedIn and X to Get More Instant Updates. Set Cyberpress as a Preferred Source in Google.
The post Claude AI Abused In Attacks On Water and Drainage Utilities appeared first on Cyber Security News.
Discover more from RSS Feeds Cloud
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
