
A newly documented Windows intrusion chain uses WhatsApp-delivered financial lures to deploy VulcanRAT207.A, a WebSocket remote access trojan that runs with SYSTEM privileges.
Morphisec’s analysis traces eight stages, plus a separate driver component, that all communicate with 61[.]18[.]208[.]27:8888.
VulcanRAT207.A malware
Victims receive a ZIP archive over WhatsApp containing Statement.exe, a financial-document lure. The file is an NRV2E-compressed wrapper that unpacks the real loader entirely in memory and writes nothing to disk.
The unpacked loader screens the host against a multi-point checklist. It checks display, disk, CPU and memory values, event log entries (IDs 4624 and 1102), registry markers and Baidu security products.
Two 50-millisecond D3D11 timing gates act as anti-emulation traps and destroy the payload if the system responds slowly. The loader also restores a clean ntdll.dll to remove EDR hooks. Eight integrity checks protect 176 function entry points.
The loader tries COM-based elevation and falls back to ShellExecuteW with the runas verb. Both depend on UAC settings. It then enables SeDebugPrivilege and injects shellcode into the Windows Task Scheduler service host using PoolParty Variant 7.
This technique queues a TP_DIRECT callback through ZwSetIoCompletion and avoids CreateRemoteThread-based detections.
Every later component inherits the LocalSystem token, so none needs to escalate again.
According to research published by Morphisec, the importless shellcode sends an HTTP POST to the C2 server and validates the response against the 0x0207 magic header. It then executes a compound bundle in memory.
A reflective loader Huffman-decodes a header-stomped Deployment DLL, whose MZ and PE signatures were erased, and maps it into memory.
The Deployment DLL then splits into three paths: driver abuse, which installs the signed GoFly64.sys driver and sends Baidu process IDs to IOCTL 0x12227A to kill bdservicehost.exe and bduserhost.exe from kernel mode; in-memory execution, which runs vulkan-1.bin directly from memory to load the RAT; and persistence, which writes vulkaninfo-64.exe, vulkan-1.dll and vulkan-1.bin to C:Program FilesCommon Files and registers a SYSTEM scheduled task named USOPrivate Kit.
At each boot, the task launches the Intel-signed VulkanInfo utility. The utility side-loads the malicious vulkan-1.dll through an unqualified LoadLibraryA call. The DLL reads vulkan-1.bin and rebuilds the same RAT. Morphisec notes the chain resembles activity Proofpoint documented for TA4922.
The RAT decrypts its configuration with a ChaCha-derived transform and enforces a single instance through the analplug mutex. It opens a named pipe at .pipe_pipe and upgrades a TCP connection to WebSocket v13. Each message carries a 50-byte header with the 0x0207 magic.
Confirmed commands let operators profile the victim and run interactive shells, create local administrator accounts and change passwords, download and launch files (0xF006, 0xF007), inject into explorer.exe (0x22000), forward data to the GoFly driver (0x10002), clear event logs, capture keystrokes, clipboard contents and the screen, take remote control of the desktop, and block network traffic with Windows Filtering Platform rules.
The RAT has six injection methods, plus stubs that target 360Tray.exe and QQPCTray.exe. An operator can also load an arbitrary kernel driver as a service.
Defenders should correlate Task Scheduler injection, GoFly device use, SYSTEM task registration and the Vulkan package.
They should also block the C2 address, restrict vulnerable signed drivers, and warn users against opening WhatsApp attachments.
The post VulcanRAT207.A Malware Spreads via WhatsApp to Gain SYSTEM-Level Access appeared first on Cyber Security News.
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